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In this supplementary note, we provide the proof of Fact 1 and detailed explanations for
Example 4, 5, and 6. The only if part of Fact 1 is proved by Sasaki (1997) and the if part is
by Kureishi (2000). However, both papers have not been published. Thus, we provide the proof
for completeness. In the explanations for Examples 4, 5, and 6, we provide tables that make it
easy to check especially coalitionally strategy-proof conditions.
Fact 1. [Sasaki 1997, Kureishi 2000] A marginal distribution proﬁle p ∈ P satisﬁes Pareto-
eﬃciency with respect to u if and only if it satisﬁes same-sideness with respect to u and at most
binary.
Proof of Fact 1. First, we show the only if part of the fact, and then, prove the if part.
(A) only if part. Let u ∈ Un. Let p ∈ P be a marginal distribution proﬁle satisfying Pareto-
eﬃciency with respect to u.
We show that (i) p satisﬁes same-sideness with respect to u, and (ii) it also satisﬁes at most
binary.
(i) Suppose, on the contrary, p does not satisfy same-sideness with respect to u.
Without loss of generality, assume
∑
i2N b(ui) > k since the other case is treated symmetry.
Since p violates same-sideness, there exist i ∈ N such that for some x ∈ (b(ui),k], pi(x) > 0.
Without loss of generality, assume i = 1.
By feasibility, there also exists j ∈ N\{1} such that for some y ∈ [0,b(uj)), pj(y) > 0 and
the following p0 ∈ P is well deﬁned. Without loss of generality, assume j = 2.





1(x) = p1(x) −  ,p0
1(x − 1) = p1(x − 1) +  , for all z ∈ K\{x − 1,x},p0
1(z) = p1(z),
p0
2(y) = p2(y) −  ,p0
2(y + 1) = p2(y + 1) +  , for all z ∈ K\{y,y + 1},p0
2(z) = p2(z),
for all h ∈ N\{1,2} and all v ∈ K,p0
h(v) = ph(v).
Then, single-peakedness implies that E(p0
1,u1) > E(p1,u1), E(p0
2,u2) > E(p2,u2), and for all
j ∈ N\{1,2}, E(p0
j;uj) = E(pj;uj). It contradicts Pareto-eﬃciency of p.
Thus, we have that p satisﬁes same-sideness with respect to u.
(ii) Suppose, on the contrary, p does not satisfy at most binary.
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1Without loss of generality, assume
∑
i2N b(ui) > k since the other case is treated symmetry.
Since p violates at most binary, there exists i ∈ N such that for some x,y ∈ K with x + 1 < y,
pi(x) > 0 and pi(y) > 0. Without loss of generality, assume i = 1.
By feasibility, there also exists j ∈ N\{1} such that for some z,w ∈ K with z < w, pj(z) > 0
and pj(w) > 0 and the following p0 ∈ P is well deﬁned. Without loss of generality, assume j = 2.
Since p satisﬁes same-sideness by (i), x,y ∈ [0,b(u1)] and z,w ∈ [0,b(u2)].
Let p0 ∈ P be such that

      
      
p0
1(x) = p1(x) −  ,p0
1(x + 1) = p1(x + 1) +  ,p0
1(y) = p1(y) −  ,p0
1(y − 1) = p1(y − 1) +  ,
for all v ∈ K\{x,x + 1,y − 1,y},p0
1(v) = p1(v),
p0
2(z) = p2(z) −  ,p0
2(z + 1) = p2(z + 1) +  ,p0
2(w) = p2(w) −  ,p0
2(w − 1) = p2(w − 1) +  ,
for all v ∈ K\{z,x + 1,w − 1,w},p0
2(v) = p2(v),
for all j ∈ N\{1,2} and all v ∈ K,p0
j(v) = pj(v).
Then, single-peakedness and risk-averseness imply that E(p0
1,u1) > E(p1,u1), E(p0
2,u2) ≥
E(p2,u2), and for all h ∈ N\{1,2}, E(p0
h;uh) = E(ph;uh). It contradicts Pareto-eﬃciency
of p.
Thus, we have that p satisﬁes at most binary.
(B) if part. Let u ∈ Un. Let p ∈ P be a marginal distribution proﬁle satisfying same-sideness
with respect to u and at most binary. We show that p is Pareto-eﬃcient with respect to u.
Without loss of generality, assume
∑
i2N b(ui) ≥ k, since the other case is treated symmetry.
Suppose, on the contrary, p does not satisfy Pareto-eﬃciency with respect to u. Then, there
exists p0 ∈ P such that for all i ∈ N, E(p0
i;ui) ≥ E(pi,ui), and for some j ∈ N, E(p0
j;uj) >
E(pj;uj).
For all i ∈ N, let λi ∈ R+ be such that λi =
∑
x2K p0
i · x, and xi ∈ K be such that
λi ∈ [xi,xi +1). Note that [1−(λi −xi)]·xi +(λi −xi)·(xi +1) = λ. Therefore, by feasibility, ∑
i2N{[1 − (λi − xi)] · xi + (λi − xi) · (xi + 1)} = k.
Also note that single-peakedness and risk-averseness imply that for all i ∈ N,
[1 − (λi − xi)] · ui(xi) + (λi − xi) · ui(xi + 1) ≥ E(p0
i;ui). (1)
Since p satisﬁes both same-sideness with respect to u and at most binary, for all i ∈ N, there
exists yi ∈ K such that yi + 1 ≤ b(ui) and pi(yi) + pi(yi + 1) = 1.
Then, together with the assumption that p0 Pareto-dominates p, (1) implies that for all
i ∈ N,
[1 − (λi − xi)] · ui(xi) + (λi − xi) · ui(xi + 1) ≥ pi(yi) · ui(yi) + pi(yi + 1) · ui(yi + 1), (2)
and for some j ∈ N,
[1 − (λj − xj)] · uj(xj) + (λj − xj) · uj(xj + 1) > pj(yj) · uj(yj) + pj(yj + 1) · uj(yj + 1). (3)
Then, by single-peakedness, (2) implies that for all i ∈ N,
xi > yi or [xi = yi and 1 − (λi − xi) ≤ pi(yi)]
and (3) implies that for some j ∈ N,
xj > yj or [xj = yj and 1 − (λj − xj) < pi(yi)].
Thus, we have that [1 − (λi − xi)] · xi + (λi − xi) · (xi + 1) ≥ pi(yi) · yi + pi(yi + 1) · (yi + 1),
and for some j ∈ N, [1 − (λj − xj)] · xj + (λj − xj) · (xj + 1) > pj(yj) · yj + pj(yj + 1) · (yj + 1).





yi + pi(yi + 1) · (yi + 1)}. However, since both sides equal k by feasibility, it is a contradiction.
Hence, we have that p is Pareto-eﬃcient with respect to u.
2Example 4. Let n = 3 and k = 2. We deﬁne the probabilistic rule f as below:
If u ∈ U3 is such that for one agent, say i, b(ui) = 1 and for any other agent j ∈ N\{i},
















Otherwise, f induces the same marginal distribution proﬁle as the uniform probabilistic rule.
Then, although the probabilistic rule f satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness, respect for
unanimity, and strong symmetry, it is not the uniform probabilistic rule.
We show that f satisﬁes respect for unanimity, strong symmetry, and coalitional strategy-
proofness. However, since it is obvious that f satisﬁes respect for unanimity and strong sym-
metry, we check only coalitional strategy-proofness.
Table 1 attached to the end of this note is designed to check coalitional strategy-proofness.
For each agent i ∈ N, the utility function of agent i is classiﬁed into four types; the type
of utility functions with b(ui) = 0, the type of utility functions such that b(ui) = 1 and (i)
ui(1)−ui(0) ≥ ui(1)−ui(2), the type of utility function such that b(ui) = 1 and (ii) ui(1)−ui(0) <
ui(1) − ui(2), and the type of utility functions with b(ui) = 2. Since there are three agents in
this example, utility proﬁles are classiﬁed into 64(= 43) types. Note that the rule f assigns the
same marginal distribution proﬁle to utility proﬁles of the same type.
Table 1 describes how the rule f assigns to each type of utility proﬁle a marginal distribution
proﬁle. Table 1 comprises four matrices. Each matrix corresponds to a type of agent 3’s utility
function; The ﬁrst matrix corresponds to the type of agent 3’s utility function with b(u3) = 0,
the second corresponds to the type of agent 3’s utility function such that b(u3) = 1 and (i)
u3(1) − u3(0) ≥ u3(1) − u3(2), the third corresponds to the type of agent 3’s utility function
such that b(u3) = 1 and (ii) u3(1) − u3(0) < u3(1) − u3(2), and the fourth corresponds to
the type of agent 3’s utility function such that b(u3) = 2. The last four rows of each matrix
correspond to the types of agent 1’s utility function. The row dented “0” in the ﬁrst column
corresponds to the type of agent 1’s utility function with b(u1) = 0, the row dented “1 case (i)”
in the ﬁrst column corresponds to the type of agent 1’s utility function such that b(u1) = 1 and
(i) u1(1) − u1(0) ≥ u1(1) − u1(2), and so on. Similarly, the last four columns of each matrix
correspond to the types of agent 2’s utility function.
Marginal distribution proﬁles are described as 3×3 matrices nested in the corresponding








is nested in the cell corresponding to the utility proﬁles such that b(u1) = 0, b(u2) = 1,(i)
u2(1)−u2(0) ≥ u2(1)−u2(2), and b(u3) = 0. The ﬁrst rows of the nested matrices corresponds
to agent 1’s allocations, the second rows to agent 2’s allocations, and the third rows to agent 3’s
allocations. The ﬁrst columns of the nested matrices corresponds to the probability that agents
3receive 0 units, the second columns to the probability that agents receive 1 units, and the third








implies that agent 1 receives 0 unit with probability 11
20, 1 unit with probability 9
20, and 2 units
with probability 0; agent 2 receives 0 unit with probability 0, 1 unit with probability 18
20, and 2
units with probability 2
20; and agent 3 receives 0 unit with probability 11
20, 1 unit with probability
9
20, and 2 units with probability 0. The bold fonts of the nested matrices indicates that the
marginal distribution proﬁles are diﬀerent from those assigned by the uniform probabilistic rule,
while the regular font shows that the marginal distribution proﬁles coincide with those assigned
by the uniform probabilistic rule.
We use Table 1 to show that the rule f in Example 4 is coalitional strategy-proof. Let
u ∈ Un, N0 ⊆ N, and ˆ uN0 ∈ UN0
. We need to show that whenever there is i ∈ N0 such that
E(fi(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);ui) > E(fi(u);ui), there exists j ∈ N0 such that E(fj(u);uj) > E(fj(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);uj).
However, it is suﬃcient to show that (a) or (b) below holds:
(a) for any i ∈ N0, E(fi(u);ui) ≥ E(fi(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);ui),
(b) there exists i ∈ N0 such that E(fi(u);ui) > E(fi(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);ui).
Since it is routine to show that (a) or (b) holds for all possible u ∈ Un, we check only utility
proﬁles I) and II) below for demonstration purposes:
I) the utility proﬁle u such that b(u1) = 0, b(u2) = 1, (i) u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2), and
b(u3) = 0,
II) the utility proﬁle u such that b(u1) = 2, b(u2) = 1, (i) u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2), and
b(u3) = 0.
In the ﬁrst utility proﬁle, we emphasize the role of the inequality u2(1)−u2(0) ≥ u2(1)−u2(2).
In the second, we explain that by coalitional strategy-proofness of the uniform probabilistic rule,
we can omit checking many possible cases of ˆ uN0.
I) First, consider the utility proﬁle u such that b(u1) = 0, b(u2) = 1, (i) u2(1) − u2(0) ≥








If b(ˆ u1) = 0, b(ˆ u2) = 1, (i) ˆ u2(1)−ˆ u2(0) ≥ ˆ u2(1)−ˆ u2(2), and b(ˆ u3) = 0, then since f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) =
f(u), (a) holds. Thus, in the following, we omit checking the case where b(ˆ u1) = 0, b(ˆ u2) = 1,
(i) ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) ≥ ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), and b(ˆ u3) = 0.
Case 1: #N0 = 1 In this case, we show that (a) holds.
Case 1-1: N0 = {1}. If b(ˆ u1)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1) ≥ u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ u1,u¡1);u1).
Case 1-2: N0 = {2}. If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
≥ 1
3 · u2(0) + 2
3 · u2(1) = E(f2(ˆ u2,u¡2);u2).
4If b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), then since b(u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥
u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
≥ 2
20 · u2(0) + 18
20 · u2(1) = E(f2(ˆ u2,u¡2);u2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 2, then since b(u2) = 1,
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
≥ u2(2) = E(f2(ˆ u2,u¡2);u2).
Case 1-3: N0 = {3}. If b(ˆ u3)  = 0, since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u3) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
≥ u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ u2,u¡2);u2).
Case 2: #N0 = 2 In this case we check that (b) holds.
Case 2-1: N0 = {1,2}.
Case 2-1-1: b(ˆ u1) = 0.
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 1
3 · u1(0) + 2
3 · u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 9
20 · u1(0) + 11
20 · u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u2) = 2, then since b(u2) = 1,
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u1(1) + 2
20 · u1(2)
> u2(2) = E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
Case 2-1-2: b(ˆ u1) = 1 and ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(0) ≥ ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 18
20 · u1(1) + 2
20 · u1(2) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 2-1-3: b(ˆ u1) = 1 and ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(0) < ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 2
20 · u1(0) + 18
20 · u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
5If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 2-1-4: b(ˆ u1) = 2.
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(2) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 2-2: N0 = {1,3}.
Case 2-2-1: b(ˆ u1) = 0.
If b(ˆ u3)  = 0, then since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u1) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
> u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
Case 2-2-2: b(ˆ u1) = 1.
If b(ˆ u3) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u3)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 1
3 · u1(0) + 2
3 · u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 2-2-3: b(ˆ u1) = 2.
If b(ˆ u3) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u3)  = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> 1
3 · u1(0) + 2
3 · u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 2-3: N0 = {2,3}.
Case 2-3-1: b(ˆ u3) = 0.
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 1
3 · u2(0) + 2
3 · u2(2) = E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
6If b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), then since b(u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥
u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 2
20 · u2(0) + 18
20 · u2(1) = E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 2, then since b(u2) = 1,
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u3(0) + 2
20 · u3(1)
> u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
Case 2-3-2: b(ˆ u3) = 1 and ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(0) ≥ ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 11
20 · u2(0) + 9
20 · u2(1) = E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u3) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
> u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
Case 2-3-3: b(ˆ u3) = 1 and u3(1) − u3(0) < u3(1) − u3(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(ˆ u2) = 1 and u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 9
20 · u2(0) + 11
20 · u2(1) = E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u3) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
> u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
Case 2-3-4: b(ˆ u3) = 2.
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u3) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
> u3(2) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
If b(ˆ u2)  = 0, then since b(u3) = 0,
E(f3(u);u3) = 11
20 · u3(0) + 9
20 · u3(1)
> u3(1) = E(f3(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u3).
Case 3: N0 = N In this case, we show that (b) holds. Note that it is suﬃcient to show that
there is i ∈ N such that ˆ ui  = ui and E(fi(u);ui) > E(fi(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);ui). Owing to Case 2-1, we
can omit checking the case where b(ˆ u3) = 0.
Case 3-1: b(ˆ u3) = 1.
Owing to Case 2-3-2, we can omit checking the case where b(ˆ u1) = 0. Owing to Case 2-2, we
can also omit checking the case where b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) ≥ ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
7If b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), or if b(ˆ u2) = 2, then since b(u2) = 1 and
u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 2
3 · u2(0) + 1
3 · u2(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 3-2: b(ˆ u3) = 2.
Owing to Case 2-3-4, we can omit checking the case where b(ˆ u1) = 0. Owing to Case 2-2, we
can also omit checking the case where b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) ≥ ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2).
If b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u1) = 0,
E(f1(u);u1) = 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
> u1(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), or if b(ˆ u2) = 2, then since b(u2) = 1 and
u2(1) − u2(0) ≥ u2(1) − u2(2),
E(f2(u);u2) = 18
20 · u2(1) + 2
20 · u2(2)
> 2
3 · u2(0) + 1
3 · u2(1) = E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
II) Next, consider the utility proﬁle u such that b(u1) = 2, b(u2) = 1, (i) u2(1) − u2(0) ≥
u2(1) − u2(2), and b(u3) = 0. Then, f(u) is equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the








Thus, since the uniform probabilistic rule is coalitionally strategy-proof, we do not need to
check the case where f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the uniform
probabilistic rule assigns to (ˆ uN0,u¡N0). Therefore, we only need to check the case where
f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is not equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the uniform probabilistic
rule assigns to (ˆ uN0,u¡N0), i.e., the case where f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is represented by nested matrices
of bold font. Note that it is suﬃcient to show that there is i ∈ N0 such that ˆ ui  = ui and
E(fi(u);ui) > E(fi(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);ui).
Case 1: b(ˆ u3) = 0.
If b(ˆ u1) = 0, and b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2 = u2, then since b(u1) = 2,
E(f1(u);u1) = u1(1)
> 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
= E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u1) = 0, and b(ˆ u2) = 1 and ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(0) < ˆ u2(1) − ˆ u2(2), then since b(u1) = 2,
E(f1(u);u1) = u1(1)
> 9
20 · u1(0) + 11
20 · u1(1)
= E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
If b(ˆ u1) = 1 and ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(0) ≥ ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(2) and b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u2) = 1,
E(f2(u);u2) = u2(1)
> 11
20 · u2(0) + 9
20 · u2(1)
= E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
8If b(ˆ u1) = 1 and ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(0) < ˆ u1(1) − ˆ u1(2) and b(ˆ u2) = 0, then since b(u2) = 1,
E(f2(u);u2) = u2(1)
> 9
20 · u2(0) + 11
20 · u2(1)
= E(f2(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u2).
Case 2: b(ˆ u3) = 1 and ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(0) ≥ ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(2).
In this case, f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is not equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the uniform
probabilistic rule assigns to (ˆ uN0,u¡N0) only when b(ˆ u1) = b(ˆ u2) = 0. If b(ˆ u1) = b(ˆ u2) = 0, then
since b(u1) = 2,
E(f1(u);u1) = u1(1)
> 11
20 · u1(0) + 9
20 · u1(1)
= E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Case 3: b(ˆ u3) = 1 and ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(0) < ˆ u3(1) − ˆ u3(2).
In this case, f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is not equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the uniform
probabilistic rule assigns to (ˆ uN0,u¡N0) only when b(ˆ u1) = b(ˆ u2) = 0. If b(ˆ u1) = b(ˆ u2) = 0, then
since b(u1) = 2,
E(f1(u);u1) = u1(1)
> 9
20 · u1(0) + 11
20 · u1(1)
= E(f1(ˆ uN0,u¡N0);u1).
Note that f(ˆ uN0,u¡N0) is always equal to the marginal distribution proﬁle that the uniform
probabilistic rule assigns to (ˆ uN0,u¡N0) in the case where b(ˆ u3) = 2. Thus, we do not need to
check this case.
Example 5. Let n = 4 and k = 2. We deﬁne a probabilistic rule f as below:
If u ∈ U4 is such that for one agent, say i, b(ui) = 0, and for any other agent j ∈ N\{i},







Otherwise, f induces the same marginal distribution proﬁle as the uniform probabilistic rule.
Then, although the rule f satisﬁes the four properties of coalitional strategy-proofness, re-
spect for unanimity, strong symmetry, and peaks-onlyness, it is not the uniform probabilistic
rule1.
We check that f satisﬁes the properties. Similarly to Example 4, it is obvious that f in
Example 5 satisﬁes respect for unanimity, strong symmetry and peaks-onlyness. We can check
that f also satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness by using Table 2. In this example, utility
proﬁles are classiﬁed into 81(= 34) types. Each type coincides with each peak proﬁle because of
peaks-onlyness. The way to use Table 2 for checking coalitional strategy-proofness is the same
as that for Table 1 in Example 4. Thus, we omit the detailed explanation.
Example 6. Let n = 3 and k = 2. We deﬁne the probabilistic rule f as below:






f2(u)(0) = f3(u)(0) = 27
30,f2(u)(1) = f3(u)(1) = 3
30,
1In the case of n ≤ 3 and k = 2, a rule satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness, respect for unanimity, strong
symmetry, and peaks-onlyness if and only if it is the uniform probabilistic rule.





f2(u)(0) = f3(u)(0) = 7
15,f2(u)(1) = f3(u)(1) = 8
15.
Otherwise, f induces the same marginal distribution proﬁle as the uniform probabilistic rule.
Then, the rule f satisﬁes strongly coalitional strategy-proofness and same-sideness, even
though it violates at most binary.
We show that f satisﬁes the properties. It is easy to check same-sideness. By Table 3, we
can check it also satisﬁes coalitional strategy-proofness. Since the way to use Table 3 is the same
as that for Table 1 in Example 4, we omit the detailed explanation.
10b(u3) = 0
b(u2) 0 1 case (i) 1 case (ii) 2
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1/3 2/3 0 11/20 9/20 0 9/20 11/20 0 100
0 agent 2 1/3 2/3 0 0 18/20 2/20 2/20 18/20 0 001
agent 3 1/3 2/3 0 11/20 9/20 0 9/20 11/20 0 100
agent 1 0 18/20 2/20 010 010 010
1 case (i) agent 2 11/20 9/20 0 010 010 010
agent 3 11/20 9/20 0 100 100 100
agent 1 2/20 18/20 0 010 010 010
1 case (ii) agent 2 9/20 11/20 0 010 010 010
agent 3 9/20 11/20 0 100 100 100
agent 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
b(u3) = 1, case (i)
b(u2) 0 1 case (i) 1 case (ii) 2
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 11/20 9/20 0 100 100 100
0 agent 2 11/20 9/20 0 010 010 010
agent 3 0 18/20 2/20 010 010 010
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (i) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (ii) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 1 (1)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 4.b(u3) = 1, case (ii)
b(u2) 0 1 case (i) 1 case (ii) 2
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 9/20 11/20 0 100 100 100
0 agent 2 9/20 11/20 0 010 010 010
agent 3 2/20 18/20 0 010 010 010
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (i) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (ii) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
b(u3) = 2
b(u2) 0 1 case (i) 1 case (ii) 2
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (i) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
1 case (ii) agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
agent 3 0 1 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0 1/3 2/3 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 1 (2)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 4.b(u3) = 0, b(u4) = 0
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1/2 1/2 0 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
agent 3 1/2 1/2 0 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0
agent 4 1/2 1/2 0 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0
agent 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 agent 2 2/3 1/3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 4 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
b(u3) = 0, b(u4) = 1
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 2/3 1/3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 4 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 4 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 4 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 2 (1)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 5.b(u3) = 1, b(u4) = 0
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 2/3 1/3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 4 2/3 1/3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 4 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 4 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
b(u3) = 0, b(u4) = 2
b(u2) 0 1 2
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 4 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 4 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 4 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 2 (2)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 5.b(u3) = 2, b(u4) = 0
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 4 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 1 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
2 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 4 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
b(u3) ≥ 1, b(u4) ≥ 1
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
0 agent 2 1 0 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 4 0 1 0 11/30 19/30 0 11/30 19/30 0
agent 1 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
1 agent 2 27/30 3/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 3 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 4 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 1 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
2 agent 2 27/30 3/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 3 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 4 11/30 19/30 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 2 (3)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 5.b(u3) = 0
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1/3 2/3 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
0 agent 2 1/3 2/3 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1/3 2/3 0 1/2 1/2 0 1/2 1/2 0
agent 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 agent 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
agent 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 agent 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
b(u3) = 1
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/15 14/15 0 1/15 14/15 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 7/15 8/15 0 7/15 8/15 0
agent 3 0 1 0 7/15 8/15 0 7/15 8/15 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/15 1/15 13/15 1/15 1/15 13/15
2 agent 2 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 3 (1)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 6.b(u3) = 2
b(u2) 012
b(u1) # of objects 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
agent 1 1/2 1/2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 agent 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/15 14/15 0 1/15 14/15 0
1 agent 2 1 0 0 7/15 8/15 0 7/15 8/15 0
agent 3 0 1 0 7/15 8/15 0 7/15 8/15 0
agent 1 0 1 0 1/15 1/15 13/15 1/15 1/15 13/15
2 agent 2 1 0 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
agent 3 0 1 0 27/30 3/30 0 27/30 3/30 0
bold : the different marginal distribution profiles from those by the uniform probabilistic rule
Table 3 (2)
the marginal probability distribution profiles induced by f in Example 6.